| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2420 |
| DP2420 Regulation And Labour Market Performance | |
| Tito Boeri; Stefano Scarpetta; Giuseppe Nicoletti | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper investigates the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e. the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide a favour in exchange for a bribe. The favour we consider in most of our analysis is the opportunity to readjust a bid. We show that a key effect of corruption is to facilitate collusion in price between firms. This can result in high public spending and inefficient allocation. We discuss the effect of other forms of bureaucratic discretion in the procurement process and analyse conditions under which unilateral anti-corruption controls may restore price competition. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Auction procedures Collusion Controls Corruption |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2420 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531504 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tito Boeri,Stefano Scarpetta,Giuseppe Nicoletti. DP2420 Regulation And Labour Market Performance. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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