| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2426
|
| DP2426 Natural Rate Doubts |
| Roger Farmer
|
| 发表日期 | 2000-04-28
|
| 出版年 | 2000
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Many economists argue that the primary economic function of banks is to provide cheap credit, and to facilitate this function, they advocate the strict protection and enforcement of creditor rights. But banks can serve another important economic function: through project screening they can reduce the number of project failures and thus mitigate their private and social costs. Strict protection of creditor rights leaves the tradeoff between these two banking functions to the market. In this paper, we show that because of market imperfections in the banking industry, strong creditor protection may lead to market equilibria in which cheap credit is inappropriately emphasized over project screening. Restrictions on collateral requirements and the protection of debtors in bankruptcy proceedings may redress this imbalance and increase credit-market efficiency. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Banks
Collateral
Creditor rights
Screening
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2426
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531509
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Roger Farmer. DP2426 Natural Rate Doubts. 2000.
|
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