| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2427
|
| DP2427 The Bail-In Problem: Systematic Goals, Ad Hoc Means |
| Christoph Ruehl
|
| 发表日期 | 2000-04-28
|
| 出版年 | 2000
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We analyse the effects of government policies, such as entry regulation and standard setting, on the evolution of an industry, the global mobile telecommunications markets during 1981-1997. Among other results, we find that countries that issue first licenses at later dates converge rather slowly and only partially, compared to early-moving countries. We find that introducing competition has a strong immediate impact on the diffusion rate, but a rather weak impact afterwards. Sequential entry is preceded by pre-emptive behaviour. These findings are consistent with the presence of consumer switching costs. Concerning standards, we find that setting a standard has a significant positive impact on diffusion for the analogue technology, but not for the digital technology. This suggests that the network advantages from having a single standard are offset by the benefits derived from the battle for developing more efficient digital systems. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Capacity constraints
Consumer switching costs
Entry regulation
Mobile telecommunications
Network externalities
Pre-emption
Standards and competing systems
Technology diffusion
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2427
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531510
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Christoph Ruehl. DP2427 The Bail-In Problem: Systematic Goals, Ad Hoc Means. 2000.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
