| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2434 |
| DP2434 Corruption And Competition In Public Market Auctions | |
| Thierry Verdier; Olivier Compte; Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the empirical evidence regarding the poor performance of the youth labour market in Spain over the last two decades, which entails very high unemployment for both higher and lower educated workers, symptoms of over-education, and low intensity of on-the-job training. It also presents a simple matching model with two types of workers ('educated' and ''non-educated') and two types of jobs ('skilled' and 'unskilled'), under which educated workers may crowd-out non-educated workers from their traditional entry jobs, showing that a combination of an increase in the relative supply of higher educated workers and rigid labour market institutions harms the training and labour market prospects of lower educated workers, while it raises the proportion of higher educated workers performing low-skill jobs. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Crowding-out Matching Returns to education |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2434 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531516 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Verdier,Olivier Compte,Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky. DP2434 Corruption And Competition In Public Market Auctions. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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