| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2438 |
| DP2438 Evaluating The Persistence And Structuralist Theories Of Unemployment | |
| Gylfi Zoega; Jerry Coakley; Ana-Maria Fuertes | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a simple theory of the quality of elected officials. Quality has (at least) two dimensions: competence and honesty. Voters prefer competent and honest policymakers, so high-quality citizens have a greater chance of being elected to office. But low-quality citizens have a 'comparative advantage' in pursuing elective office, because their market wages are lower than the market wages of high-quality citizens (competence), and/or because they reap higher returns from holding office (honesty). In the political equilibrium, the average quality of the elected body depends on the structure of rewards from holding public office. Under the assumption that the rewards from office are increasing in the average quality of office holders there can be multiple equilibria in quality. Under the assumption that incumbent policymakers set the rewards for future policymakers there can be path dependence in quality. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Citizens-candidates Competence Elected officials' corruption |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2438 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531520 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gylfi Zoega,Jerry Coakley,Ana-Maria Fuertes. DP2438 Evaluating The Persistence And Structuralist Theories Of Unemployment. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
