| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2439 |
| DP2439 Collateral Vs. Project Screening: A Model Of Lazy Banks | |
| Michael Manove; Jorge Padilla; Marco Pagano | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides a complete analytical characterization of the positive and normative effects of alternative exchange rate regimes in a simple two-country sticky-price dynamic general equilibrium model with money, technology, and government spending shocks. A central question addressed is whether fixing the exchange rate prevents macroeconomic adjustment in relative prices from occurring, in face of shocks. In the model, the exchange rate regime has implications for both the volatility and mean of macroeconomic aggregates. But the effects of the exchange rate regime depend upon both the stance of monetary policy and the way in which the exchange rate is pegged. With a passive monetary policy, a cooperative pegged exchange rate regime has no implications for macroeconomic volatility, relative to a floating regime, but implies a higher mean level of employment, capital stock, and real GDP. When monetary policy is determined optimally however, a fixed exchange rate regime leads to higher employment volatility and a lower mean level of employment and real GDP. Therefore, whether fixing the exchange rate involves a welfare cost depends critically upon the flexibility of monetary policy in responding to macroeconomic shocks. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Exchange rate regimes Sticky prices Welfare |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2439 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531521 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Manove,Jorge Padilla,Marco Pagano. DP2439 Collateral Vs. Project Screening: A Model Of Lazy Banks. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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