| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2443 |
| DP2443 A Multi-Task Principal-Agent Approach to Organizational Form | |
| Pierre Régibeau; Kate Rockett; David Besanko | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-05-30 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses the interaction of financing and output market decisions in an oligopolistic setting. We integrate two ideas that have been analysed separately in previous work: some authors argue that due to risk-shifting, debt (leverage) makes a firm 'aggressive' in its output market; others argue a firm with debts tends to be 'soft', in order to avoid bankruptcy. Our model allows for both effects. Given the key role that debt plays in this analysis, we derive debt as an optimal contract. We find that an indebted firm produces less than an unleveraged firm. The extent to which a firm is financially constrained is measured by its net worth, which determines by how much the firm will reduce its output. We find that output is a nonmonotonic function of net worth: while a moderately constrained firm reduces its output if its constraints become tighter, a more strongly constrained firm increases output. These results hold for a monopoly, but are more pronounced in a duopoly. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Debt contracts Liquidity constraints Product market competition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2443 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531525 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre Régibeau,Kate Rockett,David Besanko. DP2443 A Multi-Task Principal-Agent Approach to Organizational Form. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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