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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP2490 |
DP2490 Unemployment Dynamics, Duration and Equilibrium: Evidence from Britain | |
Simon Burgess; Hélène Turon | |
发表日期 | 2000-06-27 |
出版年 | 2000 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper studies the choice of organizational forms in a multi-task principal-agent model. We compare a functional organization in which the firm is organized into functional departments such as marketing and R&D to a product-based organization in which the firm is organized into product lines. Managers' compensation can be based on noisy measures of product-line profits. Measures of a functional area's contribution to total profits are not available, however. This effect favours the product organization. However, if there are significant asymmetries between functional area contributions to organizational success and cross-product externalities within functions, organizing along functional lines may dominate the product organization. We also consider the effects of diseconomies of span of control and cross-functional complementarities. Diseconomies of span of control sometimes favours the product organization and sometimes favour the functional organization. Cross-functional complementaries tend to make the product organization relatively more profitable. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Functional organization Organizational form Principal-agent models Product organization |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2490 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531566 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Simon Burgess,Hélène Turon. DP2490 Unemployment Dynamics, Duration and Equilibrium: Evidence from Britain. 2000. |
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