| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2504 |
| DP2504 Excessive continuation and Dynamic Agency Costs of Debt | |
| Antoine Faure-Grimaud; Jean Paul Décamps | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-07-25 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses the incentives of the equityholders of a leveraged company to shut it down in a continuous time, stochastic environment. Keeping the firm as an ongoing concern has an option value but equity and debt holders value it differently. Equity holders' decisions exhibit excessive continuation and reduce the firm's value. Using a compound exchange option approach, we characterize the resulting agency costs of debt, derive the ?price? of these costs and analyse their dynamics. We also show how agency costs can be reduced by the design of debt and the possibility of renegotiation. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Debt Dynamic agency costs Excessive continuation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2504 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531579 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antoine Faure-Grimaud,Jean Paul Décamps. DP2504 Excessive continuation and Dynamic Agency Costs of Debt. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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