| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2522 |
| DP2522 Eurosystem Monetary Targeting: Lessons from US Data | |
| Lars E.O. Svensson; Glenn D Rudebusch | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-08-29 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model demonstrating conditions under which firms will invest in the general training of their workers, and show that firms? incentives to invest in general training are increasing in task complexity. Workers? heterogeneous observable innate ability affects the variety of tasks that can be performed within a firm. This gives monopsony power to firms with ?better? workforces. As a result such firms are willing to expend resources to provide workers with general training. Since the degree of monopsony power is increasing with task complexity, firms whose workforces undertake more sophisticated tasks are more willing to finance general training. We conclude that training will take place in better-than-average firms, while bad firms will have underperforming but overpaid workers that are not likely to be trained by their current employer. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Firm-financed general training Hierarchical assignment models Monopsony |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2522 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531598 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lars E.O. Svensson,Glenn D Rudebusch. DP2522 Eurosystem Monetary Targeting: Lessons from US Data. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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