| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2534
|
| DP2534 Redistribution as a Selection Device |
| Hans Peter Grüner
|
| 发表日期 | 2000-08-29
|
| 出版年 | 2000
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper takes a fresh look at the trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods. The point of departure is to model a centralized system as one in which public spending is financed by general taxation, but districts can receive different levels of local public goods. In a world of benevolent governments, the disadvantages of centralization stressed in the existing literature disappear, suggesting that the case for decentralization must be driven by political economy considerations. Our political economy analysis assumes that under decentralization public goods are selected by locally elected representatives, while under a centralized system policy choices are determined by a legislature consisting of elected representatives from each district. We then study the role of taste heterogeneity, spillovers and legislative behaviour in determining the case for centralization. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Decentralization
Local public goods
Distributive politics
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2534
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531608
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Hans Peter Grüner. DP2534 Redistribution as a Selection Device. 2000.
|
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