| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2535
|
| DP2535 Preferential Trade Arrangements, Induced Investment, and National Income in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Ramsey Model |
| Joseph Francois
|
| 发表日期 | 2000-08-29
|
| 出版年 | 2000
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper questions the link between the establishment of a common currency among several countries and the necessity of political coordination. It begins by discussing why conducting a single monetary policy is thought to be easier within a single political unit. It then proceeds to enquire whether market mechanisms could be used to choose optimally the common policy of heterogeneous actors, and thus provide an alternative to political decision-making. The advantage of market mechanisms is that they are transparent, predictable, and usually more efficient. In particular, the paper studies a simple game through which national representatives could choose the monetary policy of a single, multinational central bank. There are no fundamental logical objections or impossible practical obstacles to such market games, and even if they are rejected on principle, they are useful in suggesting desirable amendments to traditional voting schemes. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
; Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | European monetary union
European central bank
Policy coordination
Public goods
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2535
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531609
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Joseph Francois. DP2535 Preferential Trade Arrangements, Induced Investment, and National Income in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Ramsey Model. 2000.
|
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