| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2532 |
| DP2532 Reallocation of Corporate Resources and Managerial Incentives in Internal Capital Markets | |
| Fausto Panunzi; Sandro Brusco | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-09-26 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a political-economy setting where tariffs and duty drawbacks are endogenously chosen through industry lobbying, it is shown that full duty-drawbacks are granted to exporters who use imported intermediates in their production. This in turn decreases their incentives to counter-lobby against high tariff on their inputs. In equilibrium, higher tariffs will be observed on these goods. The creation of a regional block will change the political equilibrium. Duty-drawbacks will be eliminated on intra-regional exports, which in turn will lead to lower tariffs for goods used as inputs by intra-regional exporters. Evidence from Mercosur suggests that the elimination of duty-drawbacks for intra-regional exports, led to increased counter-lobbying by users of intermediate products. In its absence the common external tariff would have been on average 3.5 percentage points (25 percent) higher. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Duty-drawbacks Political-economy Mercosur New regionalism |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2532 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531618 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fausto Panunzi,Sandro Brusco. DP2532 Reallocation of Corporate Resources and Managerial Incentives in Internal Capital Markets. 2000. |
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