| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2551
|
| DP2551 In Search of New Foundations |
| Luigi Zingales
|
| 发表日期 | 2000-09-26
|
| 出版年 | 2000
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We develop a model of waiting lists for public hospitals when physicians deliver both private and public treatment. Public treatment is free but rationed, i.e., only cases meeting some medical criteria are admitted for treatment. Private treatment has no waiting time but entails payment of a fee. Both physicians and patients take into account that each patient treated in the private practice schedule reduces the waiting list for public treatment. We show that physicians do not necessarily select the mildest cases from the waiting list. We provide sufficient conditions on the rationing policy under which cream skimming is always partial. We show that, to a large extent, one can by-pass the analysis of doctors' behaviour in the characterization of patient selection. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Waiting lists
Cream-skimming
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2551
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531623
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Luigi Zingales. DP2551 In Search of New Foundations. 2000.
|
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