G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2552
DP2552 Try Me! On Job Assignments as a Screening Device
Juan Carrillo
发表日期2000-09-26
出版年2000
语种英语
摘要The paper starts from the premise that the debate on the ?new architecture? of the international financial system should be based on a theory that endogenizes the structure of countries' external liabilities. I present a model in which the maturity of a country's external sovereign debt is the solution to an incentives problem, which may lead to reliance on short-term debt and vulnerability to runs. I study, in the context of this model, the welfare effects of an international lender of last resort, measures aimed at coordinating creditors in crises, and a tax on short-term capital flows. These measures may increase or decrease global welfare, and always leave it strictly below the first-best level.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词International debt Debt maturity Liquidity crises Lending in last resort Capital controls
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2552
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531624
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Juan Carrillo. DP2552 Try Me! On Job Assignments as a Screening Device. 2000.
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