G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2564
DP2564 Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach
Alexander Ljungqvist; Michel Habib
发表日期2000-09-26
出版年2000
语种英语
摘要We study the optimal allocation of screening tasks between two agents (incumbent vs. outsider or senior vs. junior) competing for one job. First, we characterize the inefficiencies from the principal's viewpoint of delegating the selection of the screening procedure to the incumbent. In general, the information disclosed by the screening tasks and the turnover rates will be inefficiently small due to the incumbent's willingness to undertake too many of these tasks. Second, we show that it may be optimal for organizations to favour the selection of outsider/junior agents relative to incumbent/senior ones because the former have greater implicit (career concern type) incentives than the latter to exert effort and perform efficiently.
主题Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词Screening Job allocation Career concerns Relative evaluation Personnel economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2564
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531635
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alexander Ljungqvist,Michel Habib. DP2564 Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach. 2000.
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