| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2564 |
| DP2564 Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach | |
| Alexander Ljungqvist; Michel Habib | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-09-26 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the optimal allocation of screening tasks between two agents (incumbent vs. outsider or senior vs. junior) competing for one job. First, we characterize the inefficiencies from the principal's viewpoint of delegating the selection of the screening procedure to the incumbent. In general, the information disclosed by the screening tasks and the turnover rates will be inefficiently small due to the incumbent's willingness to undertake too many of these tasks. Second, we show that it may be optimal for organizations to favour the selection of outsider/junior agents relative to incumbent/senior ones because the former have greater implicit (career concern type) incentives than the latter to exert effort and perform efficiently. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Screening Job allocation Career concerns Relative evaluation Personnel economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2564 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531635 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Ljungqvist,Michel Habib. DP2564 Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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