| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2584 |
| DP2584 The World Technology Frontier | |
| Wilbur John Coleman II; Francesco Caselli | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-10-24 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a model of optimal bank closure rules (cum capital replenishment by banks), with Poisson-distributed audits of the bank's asset value by the regulator, with the goal of eliminating (ameliorating) the incentives of levered bank shareholders/managers to take excessive risks in their choice of underlying assets. The roles of (tax or other) subsidies on deposit interest payments by the bank, and of the auditing frequency are examined. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank capital regulation Closure rules Poisson audits Bankers' rents Risk-shifting incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2584 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531653 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wilbur John Coleman II,Francesco Caselli. DP2584 The World Technology Frontier. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
