| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2607
|
| DP2607 Does the 'New Economy' Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past? |
| Robert J. Gordon
|
| 发表日期 | 2000-11-28
|
| 出版年 | 2000
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper considers merger control in a common agency framework where firms and their competitors can influence the antitrust agency and where transparency - while making lobbying less effective - also implies real resource costs. We examine the performance of two alternative standards that can be assigned to the antitrust agency in the presence of these regulatory failures. We find that under a welfare standard, lobbying leads to the clearance of relatively inefficient mergers that decrease welfare (i.e. there is a type II error). By contrast, under a consumer surplus standard, the agency will ban relatively efficient mergers that would increase welfare (i.e. there is a type I error). Lobbying actually reduces the extent to which this occurs, albeit at a cost in terms of real resources. We also find that a consumer surplus standard is more attractive when mergers are large, when increasing the size of a merger greatly enhances industry profits, when there is little transparency, and when co-ordination costs amongst competitors are low. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Political economy
Merger control
Lobbying
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2607
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531674
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Robert J. Gordon. DP2607 Does the 'New Economy' Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past?. 2000.
|
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