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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP2618 |
DP2618 Comparative Advantage and Economic Geography: Estimating the Location of Production in the EU | |
Anthony Venables; Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe; Henry Overman | |
发表日期 | 2000-11-28 |
出版年 | 2000 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This Paper considers tax competition and tax harmonization in the presence of agglomeration forces and falling trade costs. With agglomerative forces operating, industry is not indifferent to location in equilibrium, so perfectly mobile capital becomes a quasi-fixed factor. This suggests that the tax game is something subtler than a race to the bottom. Advanced 'core' nations may act like limit-pricing monopolists toward less advanced 'periphery' countries. Consequently, integration need not lead to falling tax rates, and might well be consistent with the maintenance of large welfare states. ?Limit taxing? also means that simple tax harmonization ? adoption of a common tax rate ? always harms at least one nation and adoption of a rate between the two unharmonized rates harms both nations. A tax floor set at the lowest equilibrium tax rate leads to a weak Pareto improvement. |
主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics ; Public Economics |
关键词 | Economic geography Trade Tax competition Tax harmonization |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2618 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531684 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anthony Venables,Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe,Henry Overman. DP2618 Comparative Advantage and Economic Geography: Estimating the Location of Production in the EU. 2000. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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