| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2620 |
| DP2620 Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control | |
| Damien J. Neven; Lars-Hendrik Röller | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-11-28 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We provide a simple framework for analysing how organizations are designed in a competitive economy. We focus on the allocation of rights of control and show that in the presence of liquidity constraints, transferring authority can serve as an effective means of transferring surplus, although this may entail some efficiency loss. The efficiency and organizational structure of a typical firm will depend on the liquidity of the ?marginal? agent in the market and not just on the liquidity and technology of the members of the firm. Liquidity changes in a small fraction of the population can lead to restructuring of ownership throughout the economy. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contract theory Mergers Ownership Shocks to distribution |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2620 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531686 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Damien J. Neven,Lars-Hendrik Röller. DP2620 Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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