| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2646 |
| DP2646 Who Trusts Others? | |
| Alberto Alesina; Eliana La Ferrara | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-12-19 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We construct a model to analyse the two types of tender procedures used by the European Central Bank (ECB) in its open market operations. We assume that the ECB minimizes the expected value of a loss function that depends on the quadratic difference between the interbank rate and a target interest rate that characterizes the stance of monetary policy. We show that when the loss function penalizes more heavily interbank rates below the target, fixed rate tenders have a unique equilibrium characterized by extreme overbidding. We also show that variable rate tenders have multiple equilibria characterized by varying degrees of overbidding, and that in these tenders an equilibrium without overbidding can be obtained by preannouncing the intended liquidity injection. Finally, our empirical analysis supports the assumption of an asymmetric loss function for the ECB. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | European central bank Monetary policy instruments Open market operations Tender procedures Monetary auctions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2646 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531708 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Alesina,Eliana La Ferrara. DP2646 Who Trusts Others?. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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