| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2661 |
| DP2661 Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence | |
| Jurgen von Hagen; Claudia Keser; Roy J Gardner; Karl-Martin Ehrhart | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-01-30 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How do individuals with time-inconsistent preferences make consumption-savings decisions? We try to answer this question by considering the simplest possible form of consumption-savings problem, assuming that discounting is quasi-geometric. A solution to the decision problem is then a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game between the individual's ?successive selves?. When the time horizon is finite, our question has a well-defined answer in terms of primitives. When the time horizon is infinite, we are left without a sharp answer: we cannot rule out the possibility that two identical individuals in the exact same situation make different decisions! In particular, there is a continuum of dynamic equilibria even if we restrict attention to equilibria where current consumption decisions depend only on current wealth. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Quasi-geometric discounting Time inconsistency Indeterminacy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2661 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531722 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jurgen von Hagen,Claudia Keser,Roy J Gardner,et al. DP2661 Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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