| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2673 |
| DP2673 Diversity in Organizations | |
| Antonio S. Mello; Martin Ruckes | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-01-30 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper considers why a manager would choose to submit himself to the discipline of bank monitoring. This issue is analysed within the context of a model where the manager enjoys private benefits, which can be restricted by the monitor, and is optimally compensated by shareholders. Within this setting, we find that managers will submit to monitoring when they receive favourable private information. This result is consistent with event study evidence that suggests that the market has a favourable view of financing choices that increase monitoring. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Monitoring Managerial compensation Optimal contracts Banks |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2673 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531732 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antonio S. Mello,Martin Ruckes. DP2673 Diversity in Organizations. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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