| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2682 |
| DP2682 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance | |
| Marco Pagano; Paolo Volpin | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-01-30 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We re-examine optimal monetary policy in a dynamic general equilibrium model where open market operations are the only policy instrument. The government optimizes purely over private agents? welfare. We use a money-in-the-utility-function approach with a welfare cost of ?current? inflation. Under commitment, for the most plausible specification time inconsistency takes the form of surprise inflation, if there is high initial government debt. Although ?orthodox?, this result contradicts Nicolini?s related analysis, in which surprise deflation is the main finding. Under discretion, we find that the long-run inflation rate is quite likely to be positive, not negative as in Obstfeld?s related analysis. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | monetary policy Time consistency Inflation bias Open market operations Optimal seigniorage |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2682 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531740 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Pagano,Paolo Volpin. DP2682 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance. 2001. |
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