G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2687
DP2687 The Race To the Bottom, From the Bottom
Ravi Kanbur; Nancy H Chau
发表日期2001-02-27
出版年2001
语种英语
摘要This Paper analyses the link between the internal organization of firms, their individual life cycle and the whole process of macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face dynamic agency costs. These agency costs are due to the formation of vertical collusions within the organization. To respond to the opportunity of internal collusion, firms go through a whole life cycle, becoming more bureaucratized and less efficient over time. This bureaucratization affects both the intertemporal distribution of profits in a given sector and the distribution of output across sectors. In a general equilibrium model, bureaucratization has two effects: a profitability effect on the return of innovation and a reallocation effect on the skilled labour market. First, we analyse the existence and properties of stationary equilibrium growth. Second, we endogenize the transaction costs of side-contracting and show how the growth rate depends on various organizational parameters of firms.
主题International Macroeconomics ; Industrial Organization
关键词Bureaucratization Schumpeterian growth Dynamic collusion Internal organization of the firm
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2687
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531746
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ravi Kanbur,Nancy H Chau. DP2687 The Race To the Bottom, From the Bottom. 2001.
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