| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2692 |
| DP2692 Do Monetary Handcuffs Restrain Leviathan? Fiscal Policy in Extreme Exchange Rate Regimes | |
| Andrew Rose; Antonio Fatas | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-02-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Anti-competitive mergers benefit competitors more than the merging firms. We show that such externalities reduce firms' incentives to merge (a hold-up mechanism). Firms delay merger proposals, thereby foregoing valuable profits and hoping other firms will merge instead - a war of attrition. The final result, however, is an overly concentrated market. We also demonstrate a surprising inter-temporal link. Merger incentives may be reduced by the prospect of additional profitable mergers in the future. The prospect of a future merger increases the value of becoming an insider in the first merger, which tends to hasten it. The prospect of a future merger may, however, increase the value of becoming an outsider in the first merger even more. If so, the first merger will be delayed by the prospect of the future merger. Merger control may help protect competition. Holdup and inter-temporal links make policy design more difficult, however. Even reasonable policies may be worse than not controlling mergers at all. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Endogenous mergers and acquisitions Coalition formation Competition policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2692 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531751 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Rose,Antonio Fatas. DP2692 Do Monetary Handcuffs Restrain Leviathan? Fiscal Policy in Extreme Exchange Rate Regimes. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Andrew Rose]的文章 |
| [Antonio Fatas]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Andrew Rose]的文章 |
| [Antonio Fatas]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Andrew Rose]的文章 |
| [Antonio Fatas]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
