| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2696 |
| DP2696 Monetary Policy in a Cashless Society | |
| Paul De Grauwe; Claudia Costa Storti | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-02-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper analyses the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and ownership concentration. In our framework, blockholder and manager are distinct parties and the presence of a blockholder can both protect and hurt minority shareholders. Legal shareholder protection affects both the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because of this latter effect and its repercussion on managerial incentives, outside ownership concentration and legal shareholder protection can be both substitutes and complements. When legal protection and outside ownership concentration are substitutes, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders. Moreover, strengthening legal minority shareholder protection may have adverse effects on the behaviour of the manager and of the large shareholder who both enhance share value. Hence, rules aimed at protecting minority shareholders, e.g., equal treatment rules, can be detrimental. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate governance Law and finance Ownership structure |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2696 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531754 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul De Grauwe,Claudia Costa Storti. DP2696 Monetary Policy in a Cashless Society. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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