| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2697 |
| DP2697 Quantifying the Effects from Horizontal Mergers in European Competition Policy | |
| Marc Ivaldi; Frank Verboven | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-02-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper analyses strategic bargaining between two agents each of whom negotiates on behalf of a principal. The principals face uncertainty about the bargaining skills of their agents as measured by the agents' abilities to assess the opponent's preferences. Agents then have an incentive to promote their reputation as skilled bargainers through their bargaining behaviour. We compare two different scenarios: open-door bargaining, where the principals observe the entire bargaining process, and closed-door bargaining, where they observe only the final outcome. We show that with open doors, the higher visibility of agents' actions induces low-skill agents to negotiate more aggressively than behind closed doors in order to distort their principals' inferences. Since this ?posturing? increases the probability of delay or disagreement, closed-door bargaining is more efficient. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Strategic bargaining Delegated bargaining Reputation Career concerns |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2697 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531755 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marc Ivaldi,Frank Verboven. DP2697 Quantifying the Effects from Horizontal Mergers in European Competition Policy. 2001. |
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