| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2705 |
| DP2705 Should Mergers Be Controlled? | |
| Johan Stennek; Sven-Olof Fridolfsson | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-02-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate firms' incentives for cost reduction in the first price sealed bid auction, a format largely used for procurement. A central feature of the model is that we allow firms to be heterogeneous. Though private value first price auctions are not games with monotonic best responses, we find that for comparative statistic purposes they behave like these games. In particular, firms will tend to underinvest in cost reduction because they anticipate fiercer head-on competition. Using the second price auction as a benchmark, we also find that the first price auction will elicit less investment from market participants. Moreover, both auction formats tend to favour investment by the current market leader and are therefore likely to reinforce asymmetries among market participants. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric auctions Endogenous distributions Investment incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2705 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531763 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Johan Stennek,Sven-Olof Fridolfsson. DP2705 Should Mergers Be Controlled?. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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