| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2707 |
| DP2707 Wages and Productivity Growth in a Dynamic Monopoly | |
| Helmut Bester; Emmanuel Petrakis | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-02-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We characterize the divergence between in informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect o incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria, does the market solution not show allocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not, in general, have the incentive efficient information mix: it pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Informational externalities Supply function equilibria Rational expectations Asymmetric information Mechanism design Market efficiency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2707 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531765 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helmut Bester,Emmanuel Petrakis. DP2707 Wages and Productivity Growth in a Dynamic Monopoly. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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