| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2708 |
| DP2708 Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection | |
| Fausto Panunzi; Mike Burkart | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-02-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper considers a time-inconsistent individual who has the ability to make promises that lead to a financial or reputation loss if broken. We first identify conditions under which promises made are kept, and conditions under which they are (partially) broken. Second, we endogenize the financial loss from breaking promises by considering interpersonal monitoring and explicit contracting. We describe optimal contracting under the assumptions that monitoring requires meeting and that meeting also opens the door to renegotiation of earlier promises. Third, we show how the loss from breaking promises can be reinterpreted in terms of reputation loss in the presence of incomplete information. Finally, we argue that the above results remain valid when we replace time-inconsistent preferences with limits to contracting as the source of the commitment problem of the individual. This significantly enhances the generality of these results. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Time-inconsistency Hyperbolic discounting Promises Limits to contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2708 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531766 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fausto Panunzi,Mike Burkart. DP2708 Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection. 2001. |
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