| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2710 |
| DP2710 Estimating the Wage Costs of Inter- and Intra-Sectoral Adjustment | |
| Peter Wright; Michelle Haynes; Richard Upward | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-02-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The Paper analyses the political decision that determines the degree of investor protection. We show that entrepreneurs and workers can strike a political agreement by which low investor protection is exchanged for high employment protection. This ?corporatist? agreement is feasible if the political system favours the formation of coalition governments. In contrast, ?non-corporatist? countries will feature high investor protection and low employment protection. The model also shows that the more diffused is share ownership, the higher the chosen degree of shareholder protection. Finally, the model predicts the frequency of mergers and acquisitions to be negatively correlated with employment protection. These predictions are shown to be consistent with OECD evidence. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Political economy Shareholder protection Corporate governance Employment legislation Mergers Acquisitions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2710 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531768 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Peter Wright,Michelle Haynes,Richard Upward. DP2710 Estimating the Wage Costs of Inter- and Intra-Sectoral Adjustment. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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