| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2727 |
| DP2727 Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic Growth | |
| Oded Galor; Omer Moav | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-03-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar-refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent. Meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement, coordinate on jointly profitable actions, ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating, and determine whether cheating had occurred. In contrast to established theories, cheating did occur, but sparked only limited retaliation, partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Communication Collusion Rules Anti-trust Detection Retaliation Punishment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2727 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531783 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Oded Galor,Omer Moav. DP2727 Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic Growth. 2001. |
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