| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2728
|
| DP2728 Risk Aversion, Wealth and Background Risk |
| Luigi Guiso; Michaela Pagel
|
| 发表日期 | 2001-03-27
|
| 出版年 | 2001
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The optimal competition policy when licensing is an alternative to a merger, which has the intention of transferring a superior technology, and is derived in a differentiated goods duopoly, as in the cases of Cournot and Bertrand competition. We show that whenever both royalties and fixed fees are feasible, mergers should not be allowed, which fits the prescription of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In contrast, when only one instrument is feasible, be it fixed fees or royalties, the possibility of licensing cannot be used as a definitive argument against mergers. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Merger
Patent licensing
Competition policy
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2728
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531784
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Luigi Guiso,Michaela Pagel. DP2728 Risk Aversion, Wealth and Background Risk. 2001.
|
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