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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP2729 |
DP2729 Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants - Evidence from a Natural Experiment | |
Per-Anders Edin; Olof Aslund; Peter Fredriksson | |
发表日期 | 2001-03-27 |
出版年 | 2001 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems influence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample from the late nineties encompassing more than 80 (developed and developing) democracies. Our empirical results are based on traditional regression methods, as well as non-parametric estimators. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical models reviewed in the Paper. Holding constant a variety of economic and social variables, we find that larger voting districts - and thus lower barriers to entry - are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists - and thus less individual accountability - are associated with more corruption. Altogether, proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust. |
主题 | International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics |
关键词 | Corruption Political economies Comparative politics |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2729 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531785 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Per-Anders Edin,Olof Aslund,Peter Fredriksson. DP2729 Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants - Evidence from a Natural Experiment. 2001. |
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