| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2730 |
| DP2730 Settlement Policies and the Economic Success of Immigrants | |
| Per-Anders Edin; Olof Aslund; Peter Fredriksson | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-03-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are easier to target across social groups. We present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policymaking under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer (public good) spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems. The model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems when the share of transfer spending is high (low). After defining rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation, we find considerable support for our predictions. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Electoral rules Proportionality Public spending Transfers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2730 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531786 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Per-Anders Edin,Olof Aslund,Peter Fredriksson. DP2730 Settlement Policies and the Economic Success of Immigrants. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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