| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2739 |
| DP2739 Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case | |
| David Genesove; Wallace P Mullin | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-03-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a simple model where bank runs are possible and we analyse the role of subsidization of future investment in this setting. We find that such a policy exacerbates the short-run liquidity problem for banks. Moreover, we highlight that a ?shift in expectations? about the keeping of the subsidization promises induces a bank run. We analyse the effects of a (partial) forced conversion of non liquidated deposits into banks equities, showing how a bank recapitalisation of this type may help solving the problem. In fact, the deposit to equity swap can make credible an ex post recovery of the banking system, thus preventing the shift in expectation from generating a self-fulfilling bank crisis. This commitment device may prove useful also in the case of ?political uncertainty?. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Financial crisis Bank runs Bail out International lending |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2739 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531795 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Genesove,Wallace P Mullin. DP2739 Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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