| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2741 |
| DP2741 Electoral Rules and Corruption | |
| Torsten Persson; Guido Tabellini; Francesco Trebbi | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-03-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper studies how economic integration affects transfer pricing, tax policy and welfare, when multinationals are taxed either according to formula apportionment (FA) or separate accounting (SA). It is shown that economic integration induces multinationals to lower their transfer prices under both tax systems, but that transfer prices become less tax sensitive under FA than under SA. A main result of the paper is that economic integration lowers tax rates in the Nash equilibrium under SA, but leads to higher taxes in the Nash equilibrium under FA. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Multinational enterprises Tax regimes International tax competition Economic integration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2741 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531797 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Torsten Persson,Guido Tabellini,Francesco Trebbi. DP2741 Electoral Rules and Corruption. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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