| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2742 |
| DP2742 Electoral Rules and Public Spending | |
| Roberto Perotti; Massimo Rostagno | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-03-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Prominent results of the property rights approach based on incomplete contracts as outlined by Hart (1995) say that all ownership structures lead to underinvestment and that joint ownership cannot be optimal, provided that investments are strategic complements and affect human capital only. We show that in the case of perfectly substitutable investments these conclusions are still true in the static setting, even if investments are in physical capital. However, if the parties can invest and generate a surplus twice, then joint ownership may imply first-best investments in the first stage and can well be the optimal ownership structure. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incomplete contracts Joint ownership |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2742 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531798 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roberto Perotti,Massimo Rostagno. DP2742 Electoral Rules and Public Spending. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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