| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2749
|
| DP2749 Macroeconomic Policy Lessons of Labour Market Frictions |
| Eran Yashiv
|
| 发表日期 | 2001-03-27
|
| 出版年 | 2001
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. With restricted attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology logarithmic utility, Cobb-Douglas production, and full depreciation we solve for time-consistent competitive equilibria globally and explicitly. For this class, we characterize the welfare properties of competitive equilibria and compare them to that of a planning problem. The planner is a consumer representative who, without commitment but in a time-consistent way, maximizes his present-value utility subject to resource constraints. The competitive equilibrium results in strictly higher welfare than does the planning problem whenever the discounting is not geometric.
We also explicitly consider taxation in our environment. With a benevolent government that can tax income and capital, but cannot commit its future tax rates, time-consistent taxation leads to positive tax rates on capital. These tax rates reproduce the central planning solution, and thus imply a worse outcome in welfare terms than when there is no government. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
; Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Quasi-geometric discounting
Time inconsistency
Welfare
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2749
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531805
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Eran Yashiv. DP2749 Macroeconomic Policy Lessons of Labour Market Frictions. 2001.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
