| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2753 |
| DP2753 Corporate Taxation, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Integration | |
| Guttorm Schjelderup; Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe; Hans Jarle Kind | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-03-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We explore the dynamic evolution of property rights regimes in R&D alliances using the incomplete contract approach pioneered by Grossman, Hart and Moore (Hart and Moore, Journal of Political Economy (1990), and Grossman and Hart, Journal of Political Economy (1986)). In contrast to the standard analysis, the productive asset is an excludable public good such as a patent. Moreover, both firms can decide whether to disclose their know-how and invest effort. Know-how that has once been released cannot be concealed later. We characterize different scenarios in which the optimal ownership structure may change over time due to a trade-off between inducing know-how disclosure and ensuring maximum effort. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | R&d alliances Property rights Partnerships Incomplete contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2753 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531809 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guttorm Schjelderup,Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe,Hans Jarle Kind. DP2753 Corporate Taxation, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Integration. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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