| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2754 |
| DP2754 Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work? | |
| Dani Rodrik; Ethan Kaplan | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-04-24 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Countries can repeatedly and opportunistically renegotiate the terms of agreements to which they can only complicitly assent. Therefore, when attempting to coordinate exchange rate policies, they continuously play partnership games. We develop a reduced form model of exchange rate management where, as a starting point, (a) sequences of discrete realignments and (b) shared intervention are desirable. We show that the implementation of the ex-ante optimal policy suffers from severe time-inconsistencies. We analyse the Stackelberg equilibria of the stochastic differential game played by partner countries. We find that equilibrium complicit renegotiation-proof policies are supported by net cross-country wealth transfers from the weaker to the stronger bargaining power country. Our theoretical results provide a game-theoretic interpretation of the evolution of monetary arrangements in Europe and the emergence of EMU. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Exchange rate management Renegotiation Bargaining power Cross-country wealth transfers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2754 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531816 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dani Rodrik,Ethan Kaplan. DP2754 Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work?. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Dani Rodrik]的文章 |
| [Ethan Kaplan]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Dani Rodrik]的文章 |
| [Ethan Kaplan]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Dani Rodrik]的文章 |
| [Ethan Kaplan]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
