| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2756 |
| DP2756 Monetary Policy for an Open Economy: An Alternative Framework with Optimizing Agents and Sticky Prices | |
| Bennett T McCallum; Edward Nelson | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-04-24 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper studies the provision of incentives in a large US training organization, which is divided into about 50 independent pools of training agencies. The number and the size of the agencies within each pool vary greatly. Each pool distributes performance incentive awards to the training agencies it supervises, subject to two constraints: the awards cannot be negative and the sum of the awards cannot exceed an award budget. We characterize the optimal award function and derive simple predictions about how award prizes should depend on the number of agencies, on their sizes, and on their performances. Our results indicate that the constraints on the award distribution bind and reduce the overall efficiency of the incentive system. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Performance incentive Limited liability Fixed award budget |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2756 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531818 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bennett T McCallum,Edward Nelson. DP2756 Monetary Policy for an Open Economy: An Alternative Framework with Optimizing Agents and Sticky Prices. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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