| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2769 |
| DP2769 Electoral Rules and the Emergence of New Issue Dimensions | |
| Estelle Cantillon | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-04-24 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A two-country dynamic general-equilibrium model with imperfect competition and price stickiness is considered. This work shows the conditions under which price stability can implement the flexible-price allocation as a Nash equilibrium. This is possible if and only if both countries maintain a certain positive degree of monopolistic competition. In such equilibrium, the monetary policymakers have no incentive to surprise price setters ex post. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Price stability Nash equilibrium Optimal monetary policy Open economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2769 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531828 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Estelle Cantillon. DP2769 Electoral Rules and the Emergence of New Issue Dimensions. 2001. |
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