G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2778
DP2778 Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation
Giancarlo Spagnolo
发表日期2001-05-29
出版年2001
语种英语
摘要The full insurance hypothesis states that shocks to the firm's performance do not affect workers' compensation. In principal-agent models with moral hazard, firms trade off insurance and incentives to induce workers to supply the optimal level of effort. We use a long panel of matched employer-employee data to test the theoretical predictions of principal-agent models of wage determination in a general context where all types of workers, not only CEOs, are present. We allow for both transitory and permanent shocks to firm performance and find that firms are willing to absorb fully transitory fluctuations in productivity but insure workers only partially against permanent shocks. Risk-sharing considerations can account for about 10% of overall earnings variability, the remainder originating in idiosyncratic shocks. Finally, we show that the amount of insurance varies by type of worker and firm in ways that are consistent with principal-agent models but are hard to reconcile with competitive labour market models, with or without frictions.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Insurance Incentive contracts Matched employer-employees data
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2778
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531840
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Giancarlo Spagnolo. DP2778 Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation. 2001.
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