| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2778
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| DP2778 Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo
|
| 发表日期 | 2001-05-29
|
| 出版年 | 2001
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The full insurance hypothesis states that shocks to the firm's performance do not affect workers' compensation. In principal-agent models with moral hazard, firms trade off insurance and incentives to induce workers to supply the optimal level of effort. We use a long panel of matched employer-employee data to test the theoretical predictions of principal-agent models of wage determination in a general context where all types of workers, not only CEOs, are present. We allow for both transitory and permanent shocks to firm performance and find that firms are willing to absorb fully transitory fluctuations in productivity but insure workers only partially against permanent shocks. Risk-sharing considerations can account for about 10% of overall earnings variability, the remainder originating in idiosyncratic shocks. Finally, we show that the amount of insurance varies by type of worker and firm in ways that are consistent with principal-agent models but are hard to reconcile with competitive labour market models, with or without frictions. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
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| 关键词 | Insurance
Incentive contracts
Matched employer-employees data
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2778
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| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531840
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Giancarlo Spagnolo. DP2778 Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation. 2001.
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