| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2817 |
| DP2817 The Wage Expectations of European College Students | |
| Giorgio Brunello; Rudolf Winter-Ebmer; Claudio Lucifora | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-05-29 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned with fairness. Conversely, contracts that are doomed to fail when there are only selfish actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results of a series of experiments. Furthermore, our results suggest that the existence of fair actors may be an important reason why many contracts are left deliberately incomplete. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incentive contracts Moral hazard Fairness Reciprocity Incomplete contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2817 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531873 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giorgio Brunello,Rudolf Winter-Ebmer,Claudio Lucifora. DP2817 The Wage Expectations of European College Students. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
