| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2829 |
| DP2829 The Mechanics of a Successful Exchange-Rate Peg: Lessons for emerging Markets | |
| Andreas Fischer; Michael Dueker | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In search of a macroeconomic theory of wage determination, the agnostic reader should be puzzled by the apparent contradiction between two influential theories. On one hand, in the standard search-matching theory with wage bargaining, hiring cost and constant returns of labour, the bargaining power of employees allows them to get rents and gives rise either to overemployment or to underemployment compared with the first best. On the other hand, in Stole and Zwiebel?s theory of intrafirm bargaining with no hiring cost and decreasing returns of labour, the bargaining power of employees does not allow them to get rent and always gives rise to overemployment. In this Paper, we try to reconcile these approaches. A simple matching model with large firms and diminishing marginal productivity of labour allows us to show that the two limit cases described above yield a mix of robust and non robust results: in the most general case, employees get rents and there is more frequently overemployment compared to the efficient allocation than in the standard search-matching model. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Overemployment Search Wage bargaining |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2829 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531876 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andreas Fischer,Michael Dueker. DP2829 The Mechanics of a Successful Exchange-Rate Peg: Lessons for emerging Markets. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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