| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2843 |
| DP2843 Empirical Analysis of Limit Order Markets | |
| Burton Hollifield; Patrik Sandås; Robert Miller | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-06-11 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When a firing litigation is taken to court, only the characteristics of the employees? misconduct should be relevant for the judge?s decision. Using data from an Italian bank this Paper shows that, instead, local labour market conditions influence the court?s decision: the same misconduct episode may be considered sufficient for firing in a tight labour market but insufficient otherwise. This finding is obtained after taking carefully into consideration the non-random selection of firing litigation for trial. The existence of a judge?s bias is relevant for at least two research fields. For macroeconomists it suggests that higher unemployment rates may increase firing costs via the effect on courts? decision criteria; thus, the real extent of firing rigidities cannot be assessed without considering the role of courts. For labour law scholars, this finding is important because, following traditional principles, the law should be applied in the same way for all citizens and over the entire national territory. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Internal labour relations Conflict resolutions Firing costs |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2843 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531886 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Burton Hollifield,Patrik Sandås,Robert Miller. DP2843 Empirical Analysis of Limit Order Markets. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
