| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2857 |
| DP2857 Issue Unbundling via Citizens' initiatives | |
| Tim Besley; Stephen Coate | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-06-18 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and decides whether to void or uphold the contract. If the contract is voided by the court, the parties can renegotiate a new agreement ex-post. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Optimal courts Unforeseen contingencies Risk Incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2857 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531899 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tim Besley,Stephen Coate. DP2857 Issue Unbundling via Citizens' initiatives. 2001. |
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