| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2864 |
| DP2864 Bilateral Oligopoly | |
| Johan Stennek; Jonas Björnerstedt | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-06-18 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In many intermediate goods markets buyers and sellers both have market power. Contracts are usually long-term and negotiated bilaterally, codifying many elements in addition to price. We model such bilateral oligopolies as a set of simultaneous Rubinstein-Ståhl bargainings between pairs of buyers and sellers, over contracts specifying price and quantity. Equilibrium quantities are efficient regardless of concentration. The law of one price does not hold. Prices depend on concentration of capital and concentration of sales. If the quantity sold represents a small share of both the firms' sales and purchases, then the price is close to the Walrasian price. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bilateral oligopoly Bargaining Intermediate goods Decentralized trade Walrasian outcome |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2864 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531905 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Johan Stennek,Jonas Björnerstedt. DP2864 Bilateral Oligopoly. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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